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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BUSCK CORPORATION, dba BUSCH
DEVELOPMENT, INC., and QUAILBROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 19859
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY
COMPANY and ROYAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Appellants to recover under
liability insurance policies issued by Respondents STATE FARM
FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY and ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Dean E. Conder of the Third Judicial
District Court granted Respondent STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY
COMPANY'S Motion to Dismiss and Respondent ROYAL INSURANCE
COMPANY'S Motion for Summary Judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY seeks
affirmance of the Order of Dismissal entered in its favor by the
trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, herein referred to
as STATE FARM, incorporates by reference the Statement of Facts
contained in the Brief of ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY, herein
referred to as ROYAL, with the following additions:
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY issued a condominium
apartment policy to BUSCH DEVELOPMENT CORP, dba QUAILBROOK
CONDOMINIUM, QUAILBROOK EAST CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS1 ASSOCIATION
for the period beginning August 15, 1980 and ending August 15,
1981.
(Record p. 36). The
policy contained the following
language in Section VII, D.:
ff

D.
INSURED'S DUTIES IN
OCCURRENCE, CLAIM OR SUIT:

THE

EVENT

OF

1. In the event of an occurrence, written
notice containing particulars sufficient to
identTfy the insured and also reasonably
obtainable information with respect to the
time, place and circumstances thereof, and the
names and addresses of the injured and available witnesses, shall be given by or for the
insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable. . .
2.
If claim is made or suit is brought
against
the insured, the
insured
shall
immediately forward to the company
every
demand, notice, summons or other process
received by him or his representative.

2

G. ACTION AGAINST COMPANY: No action shall
lie against the company unless, as a condition
precedent thereto, there shall have been full
compliance with all terms of this policy, . ."
(Record, pp. 36 and 56). Emphasis added.
During the time period when this policy was in effect,
the

prior

lawsuit

of

Earl

Phillip

Development, Inc., et. al. was filed.
The

first notice

received

Morgan

et.al.

vs.

Busch

(Record, p. 3 ) .
by

STATE FARM against the

subject liability policy occurred September 21, 1983, when STATE
FARM was served with the Summons and Complaint initiating this
lawsuit.

(Record p. 34) .

The notice was five years after the

alleged occurrence; three years after commencement of the prior
lawsuit and sixteen months after judgment was entered thereon.
As a consequence, STATE FARM was deprived of its rights
under the insurance contract to investigate the claim; attempt
settlement; hire counsel of its choice and to defend the prior
lawsuit.

(Record pp. 34-35).
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE

APPELLANTS HAVE NO RIGHT OF INDEMNIFICATION FROM
STATE FARM UNDER THE SUBJECT INSURANCE POLICY.
Appellants have no right of
STATE FARM for the following reasons:
A.

indemnification

against

BUSCH CORPORATION, dba BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC.:

BUSCH CORPORATION, dba BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC., herein referred
to as BUSCH, has no right of indemnification against STATE FARM
because it was dismissed as a Party-Defendant in the prior lawsuit entitled Earl Phillip Morgan, et al vs. Busch Development,
Inc. et. al., and Quailbrook Condominium Company was substituted
in its place.

Therefore, the

judgment

3

rendered

in the prior

lawsuit is against QUAILBROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY and not BUSCH.
If one concedes that BUSCH is an insured under the subject STATE
FARM

policy,

one

indemnification

on

must

conclude

there

is

the part of BUSCH because

no
no

right

of

judgment

was

rendered against BUSCH in the prior lawsuit.
B.

QUAILBROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY:

QUAILBROOK CONDO-

MINIUM COMPANY is not entitled to indemnification against STATE
FARM

under

the

subject

insurance

policy

CONDOMINIUM COMPANY is not a named insured.
the

subject

policy

is

BUSCH

DEVELOPMENT

because

QUAILBROOK

The named insured on
CORP

dba

QUAILBROOK

CONDOMINIUM, QUAILBROOK EAST CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION.
(Record, p.36). Accordingly, QUAILBROOK

CONDOMINIUM

COMPANY

is

also not entitled to indemnification against STATE FARM.
Appellants
fact

exists

qualifies

as

to

have

whether

as a named

insured

argued

that

QUAILBROOK
under

STATE

a material
CONDOMINIUM
FARM'S

issue

of

COMPANY

policy.

The

argument fails to take into account that STATE FARM'S Motion to
Dismiss was treated

as a Motion

supported by Affidavit.
response.

for Summary Judgment and was

Appellants filed no Affidavit by way of

Under such circumstances, Franklin Financial vs. New

Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040, (Utah, 1983) applies.
In that case, this court held:
"The
opponent
of
the
Motion
(Summary
Judgment), once a prima facie case for Summary
Judgment has been made, must file responsive
Affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the
trial court's conclusion that there are no
factual issues. Rule 56(e).
. . .

Thus,
when
a party
opposes
a
properly
supported Motion for Summary Judgment and
fails to file any responsive affidavits or
other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule
56 'e), the trial court may properly conclude
that there are no genuine issues of material
fact unless the face of the movant's Affidavit
affirmatively discloses the existence of such
an issue. Without such a showing, the court
need only decide whether, on the basis of the
applicable law, the moving party is entitled
to judgment." 659 P.2d page 1044.

Based upon Franklin Financial, the trial court was
correct in deciding whether STATE FARM was entitled to judgment,
POINT TWO
APPELLANTS ARE BARRED FROM RECOVERY AGAINST STATE FARM
DUE TO THEIR FAILURE TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF THEIR CLAIM.
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that STATE FARM had
a contractual duty running in favor of Appellants, there is
still the further question as to whether that duty was negated
because Appellants failed to give STATE FARM notice of the claim
associated in the prior lawsuit as required by the insurance
policy. Under the insurance contract, it is clear that the
insured must give STATE FARM written notice of any claim arising
out of any occurrence "as soon as practicable". In addition, if
suit were brought, the insured also has a duty to immediately
forward all demands, notices, or summons received by it to STATE
FARM. These requirements on the part of the insured are ai
condition precedent to STATE FARM'S contractual duty under the
insurance policy. Since Appellants breached the terms of the
subject insurance policy, STATE FARM has no contractual duty
running in their behalf.
Courts have utilized one of three basic approaches in
determining whether coverage should be afforded under policies
requiring notice "as soon as practicable" when the insured
breaches the condition.
Each approach will be discussed
separately.
A. Approach One; The first approach is to determine
whether reasonable notice has been timely given. If it has,
then coverage is afforded under the policy. If it has not, it
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is deemed to be a breach of the condition concerning notice and
no coverage is afforded.

Under this approach, time periods as

short as six months between the date of the occurrence and the
date of the notice have been deemed unreasonable.

Matthews vs.

Reliance Insurance Company, 534 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1975).

See also

Burningham Boys Club, Inc. vs. Trans America Insurance Company,
325

So.2d

167

(Ala. 1976),

eight months

deemed

unreasonable;

Taylor vs. Royal Globe Insurance Company, 240 So.2d 497, (N.
Caro. 1978) nine months deemed unreasonable; L f Italia Provisions
Corporation vs. Interboro Mutual
367

So.2d

Aetna

968

Indemnity

(Ala. 1978) , one year

Insurance

Company

Insurance

deemed

vs. Springlake,

Company,

unreasonable

Inc., 350

and

So.2d

397

Patis,

456

(Ala. 1977), two years deemed unreasonable.
In

Equity

General

Insurance

Company

vs.

N.E.2d 348 (111. 1983), the insured delayed nearly five months
in giving notice to his errors and omissions carrier of a claim
against him for professional malpractice.

The insured claimed

that before a delay in giving notice may serve as a basis for
extinguishing

the

insurer's

liability

to

an

insured,

the

insurance company must show that it was prejudiced by the delay.
As to that issue, the court held:
"Patis reaches the misguided conclusion that
it is well settled that whether or not an
insurer is prejudiced by an insured's late
notice of a claim is an issue of material
fact.
It is with this conclusion he goes
awry. . . . While prejudice may be a factor in
determining the question of whether an insured
has given reasonable notice to the insurer, it
is not a condition that will dispense with the
requirement. . . Where, as here, the giving of
notice has specifically been made a condition
precedent to a right of action against the
insurer, any prejudice resulting from a delay
in giving notice becomes immaterial. . . The
issue becomes not whether the insurer has been
prejudiced but whether reasonable notice has
been given. 456 N.E.2d at 350 and 351.
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See also Yale vs. National Indemnity Company, 664 F.2d
406 (4th Circuit, N. Caro. 1981); L f Italia Provisions Corp., vs.
Interboro Mutual Indemnity Insurance Company, supra; Oregon Farm
Bureau

Insurance vs. Safeco Insurance Company of America, 438

P.2d 1018 (Or. 1968) and Barnes vs. Wacco Scaffolding & Equipment
Company, 589 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1979).
In the case at hand, the acts which gave rise to the
prior

lawsuit occurred

in 1978.

The prior

against Appellants in September, 1980.

lawsuit was

filed

Judgment was rendered in

May, 1982.

The first notice of this claim was not received by

STATE FARM

until

September

21, 1983

coincident with

it being

served with Summons and Complaint in the instant action.
in this case is therefore
occurrence

initially

Notice

five years after the time when the

happened;

three

years

from

the

date

the

prior lawsuit was filed and over sixteen months since the date
judgment was granted.

There has been no evidence presented

by

the Appellants attempting to explain or justify their failure to
give notice for these periods of time.
Taking into consideration the time periods involved in
the

above-cited

violation

of

cases,

policies

all
with

of
"as

which
soon

were
as

deemed

to

practicable"

be

in

notice

provisions, it is clear that the time periods involved in this
case constitute a total breach of Appellant's duty to give STATE
FARM notice and forward suit papers. The trial court was correct
in determining that there was no insurance coverage owed by STATE
FARM

to Appellants.

As

was

stated

in

Pharr

vs. Continental

Casualty Company, 429 So.2d 1018 (Ala. 1983):
"Where an insured fails to show a reasonable
excuse or the existence of circumstance which
would justify a protracted delay, the court
should as a matter of law hold that there has
been a breach of the condition as to notice .
. . " 429 So.2d at 1019.

n

A. Approach Two: The second approach taken by many
courts in resolving the issue involves a two-step process. The
court must first determine whether an insured's notice to his
insurer was given "as soon as practicable" and, second, if not,
whether the delay caused prejudice to the insurer's detriment.
In cases dealing with a situation where there are no facts
justifying the delay in giving notice or no explanation for the
delay, as in the case at bar, courts have not imposed any
significant requirement regarding an insurance company's burden
to show prejudice.
In Ideal Mutual Insurance Company vs.
Waldrep, 400 So.2d 782 (Fla. 1981), in which an insured delayed
in giving notice concerning the loss of his aircraft to his
insurance carrier, the court, in holding for the insurance
company stated:
"We find that the trial judge overlooked the
fact that in the absence of proof, the failure
to give timely notice of loss is presumed
prejudicial." 400 So.2d at page 785.
See also United Services Automobile Association vs.
Allstate Insurance Company, 662 P.2d 1102 (Colo. 1983) and
Dairyland Insurance Company vs. Marez, 601 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1979).
It is clear from the facts of the case at bar, that
STATE FARM has been prejudiced due to the delay in receiving
notice from the Appellants. STATE FARM has been prevented from
investigating the facts surrounding the claim at a time when
memories and physical evidence were fresh. Further, it has been
deprived of its right to attempt settlement through normal
adjustment procedures. It has been deprived of its right to hire
counsel of its own choosing and to defend the litigation which
followed the occurrence. At this point, one cannot argue that
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STATE FARM has not been prejudiced because counsel defending
Appellants in the prior lawsuit were competent and did all that
could have been done had STATE FARM been allowed to obtain
counsel of its choice. In Sears Roebuck & Company vs. Kartford
Accident and Indemnity Company, 313 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1957) , the
insured waited fourteen months to forward notice of a claim
against it to its insurer. Notice arrived one week before trial.
In a subsequent action against the insurer for indemnification,
the Washington Supreme Court held that depriving an insurer of
the right to protect itself against liability in a prior suit
against its insured automatically constituted prejudice. The
court stated:
"To be deprived of that right constitutes
prejudice, however imponderable the damages,
and however efficient and competent the
attorneys retained by the insured. . . . " 313
P.2d at 353.
Under Approach Two, the trial court was correct in
dismissing STATE FARM as a Party-Defendant in the instant matter.
C. Approach Three; Other courts have concluded that
where a notice of claim is outside the parameters of "as soon as
practicable" that prejudice against the insurance carrier is
presumed and the burden shifts to the insured to rebut the
presumption.
In
Gerrard Realty Corporation vs. American States
Insurance Company, 277 N.W.2d 863 (Wise. 1979) , a notice of claim
was given twenty-two months after suit was commenced against the
insured and after the same had been reduced to judgment. The
court said that notice was outside the parameters of "as soon as
practicable" and therefore created a rebuttable presumption of
prejudice on the part of the insurer. The court further stated
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that as a result of the insured's belated notice, the insurance
company

was

denied

an

opportunity

to

investigate,

settle the claim brought against the insured.

defend

or

It further held

that as a matter of law, the insurance company was prejudiced by
not receiving notice until after the entry of judgment.
In applying Approach Three to the facts of the instant
case, it is clear that due to the late notice given STATE FARM a
presumption of prejudice was created.

In light of the fact that

the notice was not received by STATE FARM until after the entry
of judgment in the prior lawsuit, there is clear evidence that
the

presumption

cannot, and

was

not, rebutted

by Appellants.

After the entry of judgment, the matter is concluded and hence
the insurance carrier has been denied its right to invesitgate,
settle and defend the litigation.
clearest

of

all

cases

where

Such a factual scenario is the

an

insurance

carrier

has

been

prejudiced by an insured's giving late notice of a claim.
Under Approach Three, the trial court did not err in
dismissing Appellant's claim against STATE FARM.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Appellants are not entitled

to indemnif-

ication against STATE FARM because BUSCH is not the party against
whom judgment was obtained in the prior lawsuit.
Moreover,

QUAILBROOK

CONDOMINIUM

COMPANY

is

not

entitled to indemnification against STATE FARM because it is not
a named insured under the STATE FARM policy.
Even if STATE FARM has a contractual obligation to one
or both

of

the Appellants

correct

in

dismissing

named

herein,

Appellants'

action

the

trial

against

court
STATE

was
FARM

because of the late notice given STATE FARM regarding the claim
against Appellants in the prior lawsuit.
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This same conclusion is

reached whether the facts are analyzed under Approach One, Two or
Three discussed in the body of STATE FARM'S Brief under Piont

Two.
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Respectfully submitted this

&JS

day of July, 1984.

HANSEN, CRIST & SPRATLEY
Attorney for STATE FARM
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Karen J. McClurg
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Attorneys for Appellant
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Roger H. Bullock
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Attorneys for Defendant and
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